University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 2

1991

"Just Say No" to Integrity Testing
Michael B. Metzger
Dan R. Dalton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Metzger, Michael B. and Dalton, Dan R. (1991) ""Just Say No" to Integrity Testing," University of Florida
Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol4/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

"JUST SAY

No"

TO INTEGRITY TESTING

Michael B. Metzger*
Dan R. Dalton**
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION

...........................

THE EMPLOYER'S PLIGHT

...................

WRITTEN INTEGRITY TESTS: ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST ................................

10

13

A.
B.
C.

The .Case for Written Integrity Tests .........
The Case Against Integrity Testing ..........
A PreliminaryScreen of the Arguments .......

18
18
20
24

The
A.
B.
C.

Validity/Base Rate Problem .................
A Prefatory Example .......................
Integrity Tests and the Validity/Base Rate Problem
The Ethics of Integrity Testing ...............

27
27
30
35

CONCLUSION .............................

38

An employee's privacy is invaded twice in organizations
that exercise the full freedom given them by the traditional
law. First, it is invaded when the employer collects data
about the worker. Exhaustive questionnaires about the person's life and habits, psychological tests, and electronic tests
- even their most enthusiastic supporters in personnel departments admit that they raise a legitimate question of
unfair invasion. But they insist that the benefit to management and society outweighs the invasion. Second, the employee's privacy is invaded when the information collected
is put to use.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Estimates place the number of written integrity tests 2 employers
4
administer each year at between 2.5 millions and 5 million. Almost
one-third of the employers in certain industries regularly use such
tests to screen prospective employees, 5 and between 5,000 and 6,000
firms make some use of them.6 Opponents of integrity tests have

2. We will use the term "written integrity tests" generically, but tests of this type come
in a variety of forms. Distinctions among those forms, however, are not relevant to our purposes
here. When we refer to a written integrity test or honesty test, we include any commercially
available test which purports to assess the integrity of prospective employees for selection
purposes. A discussion of the various types of tests is included in Paul R. Sackett, Laura Burris
& Christine Callahan, Integrity Testing for Personnel Selection: An Update, 42 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOLOGY 44 (1989); Paul R. Sackett & Michael M. Harris, Honesty Testing for Personnel
Selection: A Review and Critique, 37 PERS. PSYCHOL. 221 (1984). See also Congress of the
United States Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-SET-442, 31-32 (Sept. 1990). These questions are based on existing test questions found in a variety of integrity tests examined by
OTA. The questions have been changed slightly to avoid proprietary disclosures. The questions
include:
1) How often do you tell the truth?
2) Do you think that you are too honest to take something that is not yours?
3) How much do you dislike doing what someone tells you to do?
4) Do you feel guilty when you do something you should not do?
5) Do you think it is stealing to take small items home from work?
6) Do you believe that taking paper or pens without permission from a place
where you work is stealing?
7) What percentage of the people you know are so honest they wouldn't steal
at all?
8) How many people have cheated the government on their income tax returns?
9) In any of your other jobs, was it possible for a dishonest person to take
merchandise if a dishonest person had your job?
10) Do you believe most employers take advantage of the people who work for
them?
11) Do you think company bosses get away with more illegal things than their
employees?
3. Ed Bean, More Firms Use Attitude Tests to Keep Thieves Off the Payroll, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 27, 1987, at 41, col. 3 (predicting 30% annual increase in tests administered).
4. Tim Beardsley, Mind Reader: Do Personality Tests Pick Out Bad Apples?, 26 ScI. AM.
154 (1991).
5. Jerry Beilenson, Applicant Screening Methods: Under Surveillance, 67 PERSONNEL 3
(1990) (28% of all wholesale and retail trade companies regularly use integrity tests).
6. See Focus on . . . Integrity Testing, Indiv. Empl. Rts. (BNA) No. 11, at 4 (Mar. 26,
1991) (estimated 6,000 employers using integrity tests) [hereinafter Integrity Testing]; Focus
on... "Integrity" Tests, Indiv. Empl. Rts. (BNA) No. 18, at 4 (Oct. 9, 1990) (about 5,000 to
6,000 businesses in U.S. use honesty and integrity tests to screen applicants) [hereinafter
"Integrity" Tests].
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labeled them "a new or disguised form of polygraph,"'7 "psychological
rubber hose treatments employers use to intimidate people, ' '8 and an
example of "Big Brother at work." The development of the tests and
the debate over their efficacy has received considerable attention in
the popular press,10 but curiously little mention in the legal literature. "
The passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988
(EPPA), 12 which radically reduces employers' ability to polygraph their
employees,I virtually guarantees an increase in the number of employers that will resort to written integrity testing. 14 The EPPA is "only

7. Kurt H. Decker, Honesty Tests - A New Form of Polygraph?, 4 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
141, 151 (1986).
8. Bernard Gavzer, Should You Tell All?, PARADE, May 27, 1990, at 4, 5.
9. Id. at 4 (quoting Harvard Law Professor Alan M. Dershowitz).
10. See also Gilbert Fuchsberg, Attorney General in New York Urges Integrity Test Ban:
Tool to Determine Honesty and Habits of Workers Called Unreliable, Unfair, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 1991, at E86, col. 6; Robert McGough & Elicia Brown, Thieves at Work: The Recession
Looms. Do You Know Where Your Employees Are?, FIN. WORLD PARTNERS, Dec. 11, 1990,
at 18; Christine Gorman, Honestly, Can We Trust You? Barredfrom Using Polygraphs, Employers Seek an Integrity Test, TIME, Jan. 23, 1989, at 44.
11. For the only articles making any real attempt to grapple with the issues, see Decker,
supra note 7; Carolyn Wiley & Docia L. Rudley, Managerial Issues and Responsibilitiesin the
Use of Integrity Tests, 42 LABOR L.J. 152 (1991); Comment, Prohibition of Pencil and Paper
Honesty Tests: Is Honesty the Best Policy?, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 571 (1989). A few other
pieces acknowledge the existence of a problem. See, e.g., Terry M. Dworkin, Protecting Private
Employees From Enhanced Monitoring: Legislative Approaches, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 59, 72-73
(1990); Vicki Quade, Use of Honesty Tests Raises Privacy Issue, 68 A.B.A. J. 671 (1982);
Integrity Testing, supra note 6; "Integrity" Tests, supra note 6; Focus on ... Pre-employment
Screening, Indiv. Empl. Rts. (BNA) No. 18, at 4 (Oct. 10, 1989) [hereinafter Pre-employment
Screening].
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (1990).
13. The EPPA does not apply to governmental employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(a) (1988). The
federal government is also authorized to test employees of firms doing sensitive work for governmental agencies such as the CIA, NSA, and the Department of Defense. Id. at §§ 2006(b),
(c). The providers of security services and manufacturers of controlled substances are also
exempted. Id. at §§ 2006(e), (f). Other private employers are only allowed to polygraph employees
in the case of an "ongoing investigation" into specific instances of "theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, or . . . industrial espionage or sabotage." Id. at § 2006(d)(1). For a thorough
discussion of the EPPA, see Dworkin, supra note 11, at 64-70. The EPPA is estimated to have
caused an 85 % reduction in the number of polygraph tests administered in the United States.
See Anne E. Libbin, Susan R. Mendelsohn & Dennis P. Duffy, Employee Medical and Honesty
Testing, 65 PERSONNEL 38, 47 (1988).
14. "There's a general feeling [in Congress] that integrity tests or other types of attempts
to seek truthfulness have just exploded as a result of the polygraph ban." Tina Adler, Integrity
Test Popularity Prompts Close Scrutiny, 20 APA MONITOR 7 (1989). For other authorities
attributing the increase in written integrity testing to the EPPA, see, e.g., Gavzer, supra note
8, at 4; Wiley & Rudley, supra note 11, at 159; Comment, supra note 11, at 572; Christi Harlan,
Written "Honesty" Tests Draw Interest as Law Bars Polygraphsas Hiring Tool, WALL ST. J.,
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the first salvo in the 'war' between employee rights to privacy and
job security versus the employer's need to know.' ' 15 Integrity testing
raises many of the same issues raised by polygraph testing,16 and the
same groups that fought for polygraph regulation are turning their
attention to integrity tests. 17 The American Psychological Association
(APA) has recently entered the fray with a report opposing the banning of integrity testing,18 and is reported to have encouraged at least
three states 19 not to join the ranks of those few that currently regulate
such testing.20 And at least one observer believes that Congress is
likely to take another look 21 at regulating integrity testing.2

Jan. 3, 1989, at B4, col. 2; Integrity Testing, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting New York State
Attorney General Robert Abrams as stating that "[w]ith the outlawing of lie-detector tests as
a condition of employment, more and more employers" have turned to integrity tests). For a
discussion of the other factors contributing to employers' desire to use written integrity tests,
see infra notes 26-49 and accompanying text.
15. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 72.
16. See Harlan, supra note 14, at B4, col. 3 ("written tests are bringing with them some
of the same problems that plagu'ed polygraphs"); Wiley & Rudley, supra note 11, at 159 (concerns
about test validity, potential adverse impact, and employee privacy, which have been voiced
about written tests are the same concerns that prompted passage of EPPA); see also infra
notes 54-61, 79-85 and accompanying text.
17. The primary opponents of polygraph testing were organized labor and the ACLU. See
Decker, supra note 7, at 141 (organized labor "has consistently opposed the use of lie detection
or truth eliciting devices in the employment relationship"); Harlan, supra note 14, at B4, col.
3 (recounting union and labor opposition to the polygraph); Quade, supra note 11, at 671 (listing
ACLU objections to integrity tests); Comment, supra note 11, at 574 n.9 (ACLU a major
political force challenging constitutionality of pencil and paper honesty tests and has lobbied
Congress to restrict their use) citing Quade, supranote 11; Ching Wah Chin, ProtectingEmployees and Neglecting Technology Assessment: The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988,
55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1315, 1320 n.20 (1990) (citing support for polygraph legislation by
AFL-CIO, ACLU, and other groups); Pre-employment Screening, supra note 11, at 4 (state
AFL-CIO and ACLU among chief supporters for New York legislation aimed at prohibiting
integrity testing).
18. APA TASK FORCE ON THE PREDICTION OF DISHONESTY AND THEFT IN EMPLOYMENT SETTINGS,

QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN THE PREDICTION OF TRUSTWORTHINESS IN

(1991) [hereinafter APA TASK FORCE]; see also
discussion infra notes 78, 122 and accompanying text.
19. The APA is said to have advised the South Dakota and Connecticut legislatures that
proposed legislation banning the use of integrity tests should be withdrawn. See Adler, supra
note 14, at 7. The APA is also reported to have sent a copy of its report to New York's Attorney
General. See APA Task Force Releases Final Report on Integrity Testing, PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCI. AGENDA, May-June 1991, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Final Report on Integrity Testing].
20. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
21. The EPPA originally included pencil and paper tests, but they were dropped when it
appeared that their inclusion threatened to prevent the statute's passage. Dworkin, supra note
11, at 72.
22. "A Congress intent on protecting privacy and job security is likely to . . . severely
PRE-EMPLOYMENT SELECTION DECISIONS
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Whatever Congress ultimately does on the issue,? state legislatures
and courts are very likely to confront it in the near future.H At least
one state legislature is reported to have eschewed action on integrity
tests due to uncertainty concerning their validity.? In this article we
attempt to provide some guidance for the policymakers who will have
to grapple with the subject of integrity testing. We examine the legal,
ethical, and psychometric dimensions of such tests, ultimately concluding that validity problems militate against their use as an employment
screening device. We begin our journey toward that conclusion with
a sympathetic look at the reasons why employers are motivated to
indulge in integrity testing.
II. THE EMPLOYER'S PLIGHT
Employee theft is a problem of major dimensions for American
business.2r Estimates of the annual cost of employee theft vary dramatically,27 ranging from $15 billion to $50 billion per year. 8 Estimates

restrict the use of pencil-and-paper tests." Id. at 73. This proposition has not enjoyed universal
assent. See Robin Inwald, Those "Little White Lies" of Honesty Test Vendors, 67 PERSONNEL
52 (June 1990) ("little likelihood that any regulations will be put into effect for a long, long
time"). Nor does everyone think that banning written integrity tests would be a good idea. See
Comment, supra note 11, at 573, 595-96 (opposing prohibition and suggesting regulation).
23. Even if Congress does eventually act, it may take a long time to do so. It took Congress
20 years (and over 40 introduced bills) to regulate the polygraph. Yvonne Koontz Sening, Heads
or Tails: The Employee Polygraph ProtectionAct, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 235, 242 (1989).
24. Pre-employment Screening, supra note 11, at 4 (predicting "more legislation on the
state level, as well as legal challenges to the tests").
25. See Comment, supra note 11, at 594 n.119 ("lack of sufficient information on the validity
and accuracy of written honesty examinations," as well as lack of precedent or legislation
persuaded Oregon legislature to table proposed bill on integrity testing).
26. For a thorough treatment of the subject, see RICHARD HOLLINGER & JOHN P. CLARK,
THEFT BY EMPLOYEES

(1983).

27. For the argument that estimates of employee theft "seem to depend more on the motives
of the estimators than on any objective collection and analysis of credible data," see Michael
Tiner & Daniel J. O'Grady, Lie Detectors in Employment, 23 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 85, 89
(1988). The authors, both union employees, argue that estimates of employee theft are probably
exaggerated. Id. at 90.
28. See Gavzer, supra note 8, at 5 ($30 to $40 billion); Individ. Empl. Rts. (BNA), Sept.
13, 1988, at 3 ($15 to $25 billion); Mark Lipman & W.R. McGraw, Employee Theft: A $40
Billion Industry, 498 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 57 (1988) ($40 billion); Quade,
supra note 11, at 671 (Commerce Department estimates companies are losing $40 to $50 billion
a year from employee theft); John F. Steiner, Honesty Testing, 15 Bus. F. 31 (Spring 1990)
($40 billion); Robert J. Tersine & Roberta S. Russell, Internal Theft: The Multi-Billion-Dollar
DisappearingAct, Bus. HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 11, 11 (up to $44 billion). Nor are
businesses particularly adept at catching pilfering employees. See Sandra N. Hurd, Use of the
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of "intangible theft," such as falsified time cards, making personal
telephone calls, and taking fake sick days, run even higher - to $230
billion per year.- Some industries are particularly vulnerable to employee theft. For example, the Wall Street Journal recently noted
that 75% of all retail employees know someone who is stealing from
their respective employer.30 Additionally, in studies of the supermarket
industry 43% of the respondents admitted some type of theft of company cash or property, estimating that the "average employee" at
their stores steals approximately $1,209 per year.3 1 In fact, up to 30%
of business failures have been ascribed to employee theft.32
Nor is employee theft the only problem confronting employers.
Nearly forty percent of all employees falsify their job applications,3
and drug and alcohol abuse may cost business an additional $60 billion
to $98 billion per year. Drug-users are far less productive than their
co-workers, miss ten times as many workdays, are three times as
likely to injure themselves or others, and are much more likely to
steal from their employers.- As if this were not enough to give employers a powerful incentive to screen prospective employees, the Drug-

Polygraph in Screening Job Applicants, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 529, 535 (1985) (pilfering employees
go undetected for an average of three years) (citing Note, The Working Man's Nemesis - The
Polygraph, 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 94, 100 (1974)).
29. Gavzer, supra note 8, at 5, 7 (reporting U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates).
30. See David J. Solomon, Hotlines and Hefty Rewards: Retailers Step Up Efforts to Curb
Employee Theft, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1987, at 37, col. 3. Retailers are especially vulnerable
to employee theft because cash and merchandise are so accessible to their employees. Peter D.
Bullard & Alan J. Resnick, SMR Forum: Too Many Hands in the Corporate Cookie Jar,25
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 51, 52 (1983). Losses from employee theft may amount to as much as 2%
of retail sales. Id. at 51.
31. John W. Jones, Karen B. Slora & Michael W. Boye, Theft Reduction Through Personnel
Selection: A Control Group Design in the Supermarket Industry, J. Bus. & PSYCHOLOGY
1990, at 275, 275.
32. See Robert Taylor, A Positive Guide to Theft Deterrence, 65 PERSONNEL J. 36 (1986);
Tersine & Russell, supra note 28, at 12.
33. See Brad V. Driscoll, The Employee Polygraph ProtectionAct of 1988: A Balance of
Interests, 75 IOWA L. REV. 539, 554 n.156 (1990) (citing Edward Tivman, Truth and Consequences: What's Wrong with Lie-Detector Tests, 17 NEW YORK, Mar. 12, 1984, at 53).
34. See Jon D. Bible, Screening Workers for Drugs: The Constitutional Implications of
Urine Testing in Public Employment, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 309, 314 (1986) ($60 billion); Elliot S.
Kaplan, Judith Bevis Langevin & Richard A. Ross, Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace:
The Employers' Perspective, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 365, 368 (1988) ($65 billion - alcohol
abuse; $33 billion - drug abuse); Charles S. Pendleton, Drug Abuse Strategies for Business,
SECURITY MGMT., Aug. 1986, at 75 ($70 billion).
35. Janice Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 52, 53.
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Free Workplace Act of 198836 requires federal contractors and grantees
to maintain a drug-free workplace or lose their funding. Finally, employers are increasingly being held liable for their employees' wrongdoing outside the scope of their employment via the doctrine of neg37
ligent hiring.
Employers obviously prefer to screen out potential problem employees before hiring rather than discharging them after problems
arise. Preemployment screening obviates the risk of liability to third
parties under either a respondeat superior or negligent hiring theory,
and it is getting increasingly difficult and expensive to fire proven
problem employees. The erosion of the doctrine of employment at
willM and collective bargaining agreements make firing an employee
more problematic, 39 and employer discharge decisions are increasingly

36. Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. V, subtitle D, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified at 41 USC §§
701-07 (1988)).
37. Negligent hiring therefore extends the employer's liability exposure beyond the traditional doctrine of respondeat superior, which only holds employers liable for wrongs committed
by employees within the scope of their employment. On negligent hiring, see Gavzer, supra
note 8, at 5; David L. Gregory, Reducing the Risk of Negligence in Hiring, 14 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 31, 33-36 (1988); Kaplan, Langevin & Ross, supra note 34, at 369-74. For some
representative cases, see J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391 (Va. 1988);
Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, 496 N.E.2d 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Cramer v. Housing
Opportunities Comm'n, 501 A.2d 35 (Md. 1985); Cutter v. Farmington, 498 A.2d 316 (N.H.
1985); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Inv., 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
38. For the classic statement of this doctrine, see Payne v. Western & Atlanta R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884): "All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of a
legal wrong." On the erosion of the doctrine of employment at will, see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Jeffrey L. Harrison, The
"New" Terminable-at-WillEmployment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69
IOWA L. REV. 327 (1984); Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine:
Management Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1983); Paul Lansing & Richard Pegnetter,
Fair Dismissal Procedures for Non-Union Employees, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 75 (1982); Peter
Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of
Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986); Jane P. Mallor, Discriminatory Discharge
and the Emerging Common Law of Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 651 (1986); Note,
Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980). Wrongful discharge litigation is potentially quite
expensive for employers. In one state (California), for example, a substantial portion of the jury
awards in such cases averaged nearly $500,000. See Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an
Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1137, 1160 n.85 (1989).
39. Unionized employees can seek arbitration of their discharge. See Ken Jennings, Dilip
D. Kare & Amit Goela, An Analysis of Arbitration Decisions in Employee Theft Cases, 42
LAB. L.J. 160 (1991). One study indicated that even where relatively serious charges such as
theft were at issue arbitrators overturned management's discharge decision in nearly 75% of
the cases. Id.
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followed by employee defamation suits.4 ° Even a successful defense
4
against such a suit can cost an employer as much as $250,000. '
Opponents of various forms of employer screening commonly assert
that such screening is unnecessary because more thorough reference
checking and background investigation will effectively weed out potential problem employees.42 But many employers fear that vigorous reference checking may itself trigger legal liability,- and attempts to
check prior employment may yield very little usable information."
Fearing defamation liability, many employers have adopted "silence
policies," thus refusing to discuss former employees. 45 In consequence,
"[e]mployees discharged from jobs for theft and embezzlement often
find it relatively easy to secure new opportunities for employment
crime, at least in part because of former employers' reluctance to

40. See John Bruce Lewis, Bruce L. Offley & Gregory V. Mersol, Defamation and the
Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposalsfor Reform, 54 Mo. L. REv. 797, at 798-800
(1989); 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitatingthe Flow of Truthful PersonnelInformation:
Some Needed Change in the StandardRequired to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defame,
26 AM. Bus. L.J. 305, 306 & n.9 (1988); Ann M. Barry, Defamation in the Workplace: The
Impact of Increasing Employer Liability, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 264, 264-66 (1989).
41. See Lewis, Offley & Mersol, supra note 40, at 798 n.3; Gregory Stricharchuk, Fired
Employees Turn the Reason For Dismissal Into a Legal Weapon, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1986,
at A31, col. 4; JoAnn Tooley et al., Scaring Bosses Into Silence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 125.
42. See, e.g., Polygraph Protection Act Causes Search for Other Ways of Screening Job
Applicants, 129 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 9, 10 (1988); Quade, supra note 11, at 671.
43. "[M]any employers have deliberately chosen not to pursue aggressive inquiries regarding
job applicants, apparently in response to the strictures of employment discrimination, constitutional, criminal, privacy, and defamation law." Gregory, supra note 37, at 32.
44. Denying employment on the basis of arrest records may violate state and federal antidiscrimination provisions. Id. at 36. Also, "[s]ome states deliberately restrict employer access
to information about criminal convictions, may encourage ex-convicts to apply for jobs without
any requirement to reveal criminal records, and may prohibit employer use of convictions unless
directly related to the specific employment." Id. at 37-38.
45. See Lewis, Offley & Mersol, supra note 40, at 834; Jolie Solomon, Reference Preference:
Employers Button Lips, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1990, at B1, col. 1; Barry, supra note 40, at 265
n. 10. As a result of such policies, "the flow of truthful personnel information, especially between
former and prospective employers in regard to job applicants, has been reduced to a trickle
and threatens to evaporate completely." Reed & Henkel, supra note 40, at 306. Unfortunately
for employers, in a growing number of states "silence policies" afford little protection due to
the "compelled self-publication" doctrine, which dispenses with the traditional requirement that
a defendant must have communicated the defamatory statement to a third party before liability
will ensue. For a thorough discussion of this doctrine, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation in
the Employment Discharge Context: The Emerging Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication,26
DUQ. L. REV. 227 (1987).
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speak out truthfully. ' ' 46 Thus, in recent decades employers have found
themselves trapped between "legal developments ... making it more
difficult and costly to 'get rid of mistakes' ' '47 and doctrines "creating
employer liability for torts such as negligent hiring and retention."4
Employers caught in this "Catch-22 '' 9 between increasing liability
and their decreasing ability to acquire meaningful information about
job applicants turned increasingly to the polygraph as a way out of
their dilemma. In 1985, for example, it was estimated that some 1.7
million polygraph examinations were administered to employees and
prospective employees.50 Employers saw the polygraph as an objective,5 1 highly accurate 52 device which did not appear to have a discriminatory impact on protected groups.H
The growing use of the polygraph in the employment context,
however, evoked a rising tide of criticism. Opponents of polygraph
testing charged that such testing raised serious privacy- issues regarding the questions asked by polygraph examiners.M Also worrisome are

46. Reed & Henkel, supra note 40, at 307.
47. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 84.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 85.
50. Benjamin Kleinmuntz & Julian J. Szucko, Lie Detection in Ancient Times: A Call for
Contemporary Scientific Study, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 766, 766 (1984).
51. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 62.
52. See id. at n.15 (estimates of lie detector accuracy ranging from 75% to 98%, higher
percentages coming from field studies); Hurd, supra note 28, at 532-33 (70% to over 90%); Lisa
Brunn, Privacy and the Employment Relationship, 25 Hous. L. REv. 389, 407 (1988) (quoted
accuracy rates of 70% to 90%); Chin, supra note 17, at 1325 n.45 (most reliable lie detection
technique). "Accuracy," as used in this context, includes both the "reliability" and the "validity"
of an examination device. Hurd, supra note 28, at 532. "Reliability" means 'the consistency of
scores obtained by the same person when retested with the identical test or with an equivalent
form of the test." Id. Donald H.J. Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV.
73, 75 n.13 (1971). "Validity" refers to 'the degree to which the test actually measures what it
purports to measure." Id. On the distinction between test reliability and test validity, see also
Hurd, supra note 28, at 532.
53. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 62 & n.12.
54. The right to privacy has been accorded fundamental status by some prominent jurists.
See, e.g., Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("the beginning of all freedom"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men").
For the seminal article on the subject, see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890) (calling for recognition of a "general right of the
individual to be let alone"); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
55. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 63 (questions asked during pretest phase when
operator is establishing a baseline reading often highly invasive of privacy and unrelated to
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problems with both employee access to, and employer dissemination
of, the results of the examination.- Opponents expressed concern over
the polygraph's potential use as a means of employee intimidation or
discrimination against potential employees with pro-union sentiments. 57 They noted that the accuracy of a polygraph examination
depends, among other things,- upon the experience of the examiner, 59
and argued that inaccurate test results had caused employers to make
decisions that haunted innocent employees for life.- Most significantly,
they argued that even the most reliable polygraph examinations result
61
in an unacceptably high level of inaccurate identifications.
Twenty-two states responded to these criticisms with statutes restricting the use of polygraphs as preemployment screening devices,and in 1983, the federal Office of Technology Assessment issued a
report critical of the polygraph's validity.63 In 1988, after a number
of false starts, Congress passed the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act, effectively denying most private employers the use of polygraph as a preemployment screening device. Not surprisingly, given
the powerful incentives employers have to screen out potential problem
employees, many employers who have been denied the use of the
polygraph have turned to the written integrity test as a screening
device.
III.

WRITTEN INTEGRITY TESTS: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST

A.

The Case for Written Integrity Tests

Written integrity tests were developed for military use in the late
1940s and have been used by some private sector employers since the
employment); Hermann, supra note 52, at 82-84 & nn.40-43 (listing sample questions asked
during polygraph exams).
56. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 63 n.20; Hermann, supra note 52, at 86; Hurd,
supra note 28, at 537; Driscoll, supra note 33, at 556.
57. See Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 27, at 86.
58. For an extensive list of the factors which allegedly can affect the outcome of a polygraph
examination, see Hurd, supra note 28, at 530-31; Chin, supra note 17, at 1324.
59. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 28, at 531 (proper administration of test "crucial" to accuracy); Driscoll, supra note 33, at 548; Chin, supra note 17, at 1323.
60. See Chin, supra note 17, at 1325-26; see also Note, Lie Detectors in the Workplace:
The Need for Civil Actions Against Employers, 101 HARV. L. REV. 806, 814 (1988) (persons

failing test may be branded liars).
61. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 28, at 537; Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 27, at 97; Driscoll,
supra note 33, at 547; Chin, supra note 17, at 1325.
62. See the statutes collected in Chin, supra note 17, at 1331 n.68. Twenty-seven others
required the licensing of polygraph examiners. Id. at 1331 n.69.
63. Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research
Review and Evaluation (A Technical Memorandum), OTA-TM-H-15 (1983).
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1960s.4 Along a number of practical dimensions, written tests compare
quite favorably with polygraph examinations. The tests are relatively
inexpensive to administer,6 and no specialized equipment, facilities,
or trained examiners are necessary. Employers commonly administer
vendor provided tests to prospective employees, sending the completed
tests to the vendor for "scoring." The employer is then subsequently
told by the vendor which prospective employees have been identified
by the test as having a propensity toward dishonesty.66
More important, written integrity tests are less intimidating than
polygraph examinations67 and examinees who fail written exams are
less likely to be stigmatized than are those who fail a polygraph exam.Unlike polygraph exams, written exams typically are interpreted without reference to normative standards and are less subjectively scored.69
As a result, they are therefore alleged to be substantially more objective and reliable than polygraph exams. 7- And, because polygraph
examinations are most accurate when a specific incident of wrongdoing
is under investigation,71 written exams may be superior to the polygraph as a general use, preemployment screening device.
One study which supports the use of integrity tests argues that
they meet all of the criteria that any personnel selection procedure
must satisfy.7 2 In short, they work, allowing firms to screen out many
potential problem employees" The tests may be the best tool available

64. Harlan, supra note 14, at B4, col. 2.
65. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 72 & n.75 (tests cost from $6.00 to $15.00 and are
easier to administer).
66. Vendors differ in the cut-off scores they employ and the means by which the dishonesty
determination is made.
67. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 9; Dworkin, supra note 11, at 73.
68. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 9. But see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
69. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 9.
70. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 9. There is some disagreement on this point.
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 73 (written exams are "not as accurate as a well-administered polygraph test"). We discuss the accuracy issue in detail infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
71. See Hermann, supra note 52, at 85; Hurd, supra note 28, at 536.
72. See John Jones, Philip Ash & Catalina Soto, Employment Privacy Rights and Pre-employment Honesty Tests, 15 EMPLOYEE RELS. L.J. 561, 573 (1990). These criteria are that the
procedure in question should: 1) be developed in accordance with published professional standards; 2) be demonstrably related to the requirements of the job; 3) provide measurements that
are stable and repeatable; 4) afford equal opportunity to all applicants; and 5) limit inquiries
into personal affairs to those that are job-related.
73. Id. at 574. For the same argument in the polygraph context, see Hurd, supra note 28,
at 540. Hurd observes that there is a divergence between the interests of employers and job
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for the job, 74 and they may be more objective than traditional hiring
methods. 75 No one can credibly deny either the significance of the
employee theft problem 76 or that employers have a legitimate interest
in hiring honest employees. 77 Finally, those who would ban the use of
integrity tests must confront the fact that, as the APA concluded, "to
do so would only invite alternative forms of preemployment screening
that would be less open, scientific, and controllable." 78
B.

The Case Against Integrity Testing

Written integrity tests are vulnerable to some of the same criti79
cisms that were earlier made concerning polygraph examinations.

applicants on this point. The qualified job applicant "wants the process to be accurate every
time, lest he or she be the one who is not hired as the result of an inaccurate test." Id.
Employers, on the other hand, are more concerned with weeding out bad applicants than they
are with the possibility that some good applicants may thereby be eliminated. Id. Rather,
employers are likely to argue that they should be allowed to assume the risk associated with
any selection method that they chose. Id. at 535.
74. Decker, supra note 7, at 147.
75. "Many hiring decisions are already based on extremely subjective judgments by personnel directors. If a hiring decision may be made based on instinct, hunch, or the gut reaction of
the interviewer, is it appropriate to limit or prohibit the use of a device such as the polygraph
when it is, at least arguably, not significantly less accurate than traditional methods?" Hurd,
supra note 28, at 535.
76. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
77. One of the few extant cases involving integrity testing explicitly recognizes the employer's interest. See Heins v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 534 A.2d 592, 594 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1987) ("employee honesty is a genuine and job-related concern for an employer"). In Heins
a part-time worker unsuccessfully appealed a denial of unemployment compensation benefits
premised upon the finding that his discharge was justified due to his "willful misconduct" in
refusing to take an honesty test required of all employees. The plaintiff argued that the test
was unreasonably intrusive and constituted a new condition of employment. Id. at 593. The
court observed that "an employee's privacy rights must be weighed against an employer's
legitimate desire to prevent theft." Id. at 594. Although the plaintiff employee had asserted
that the test was inaccurate and an unreliable predictor of employee behavior, he had introduced
no evidence to that effect other than his own subjective belief. Id. at 594-95. Even had additional
evidence been introduced, however, it might not have led to a different outcome in view of the
court's observation that "in any event, the fact that the test may not have been of the highest
reliability does not necessarily render Employer's request or decision to use it unreasonable."
Id. at 595.
78. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 26; see also Chin, supra note 17, at 1343-44 n.125
(noting renewed employer interest in graphology, or handwriting analysis, as tool for making
employment decisions); Gilbert Fuchsberg, Integrity-Test PublishersFearPending Study, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 20, 1990, at B1, col. 3, B7, col. 1; Pre-employment Screening, supra note 11, at
4 (both expressing similar fears).
79. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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Opponents of integrity testing argue that it invades employees' privacy
and is an affront to their dignity.8° They worry that tests could be
used to screen out job applicants who have pro-union sympathiessi or
who are likely to resist corporate pressures to commit immoral or
unethical acts. 2 Opponents also fear that the tests may have an adverse
impact on minorities. They further complain that employers only
administer such exams to lower level employees, declining to test
managers whose dishonesty may cause their organizations far greater
harm. 1 Finally, the opponents voice the fear that those who fail integrity tests may be stigmatized as potentially dishonest.s
The critics also raise the possibility that integrity tests may not
effectively accomplish the purposes for which employers use them.
The tests may provide managers with a false sense of security,8 becoming a substitute for managerial thought.8 7 They may also screen
out persons of high moral character,88 or result in the replacement of

80. See, e.g., Quade, supra note 11, at 671; Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 27, at 87-89. See
also the discussion of potential employer liability for invasion of privacy infra note 97 and
accompanying text.
81. See Susan Dentzer, Can You Pass the Job Test?, NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1986, at 46, 49.
82. Id.; see also Gavzer, supra note 8, at 5.
83. See Comment, supra note 11, at 582-83 n.53 (tests conceivably could contain questions
worded in a way that does not provoke the same responses from persons of varying racial and
ethnic backgrounds).
84. See Gavzer, supra note 8, at 4.
85. See Inwald, supra note 22, at 55-56; Pre-employment Screening, supra note 11, at 4;
Wiley & Rudley, supra note 11, at 154.
86. Inwald, supra note 22, at 58.
87. See Inwald, supra note 22, at 52, for the following observation:
You want better employees. The [exam] vendors can help you. You want a "yes-no"
answer. They're willing to give it, and it will not be anything like those "wishywashy" psychologists' reports that actually put the burden of making the hiring
decision back on you. Yes, you will get a "go-no go," "honest-dishonest," "violentnonviolent" rating that is "validated" and "accurate" and "reliable."
Id. Similar criticisms have been made concerning polygraph examinations. See, e.g., Tiner &
O'Grady, supra note 27, at 91-92 ("[p]olygraphs give unreflective employers the illusion of good
decisionmaking while excusing them from the toil and thought that effective judgments inevitably
require"); Chin, supra note 17, at 1342 (polygraphs reflect "employers' wish for an inexpensive,
simple device that will solve their management problems").
88. See Comment, supra note 11, at 582 n.53 for the following hypothetical:
Honesty exams are designed to detect test subjects who falsify answers and respond
with the best sounding answer for each question. However,... A's moral character
actually is superb and is truly represented by the best sounding answer. Even
though A would be an outstanding employee, his chances of obtaining the job may
be diminished because his exam responses sounded too good.
Id. (original emphasis).
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"the pen pilferer or time stealer with someone who doesn't steal pens
or time, but is incompetent and slow at getting the job done. ' 89 The
test may also replace the pen pilferer with someone who "is a better
denyer on the test and turns out to be both a major thief (those are
the most difficult to detect) and incompetent. '"- Obviously, the more
applicants a test screens out, the more potential thieves will be rejected, but excessive screening can itself impose costs on the employer. 91
Critics also assert that employers who opt to use integrity tests
as a screening device may be exposing themselves to the risk of legal
liability. However, only one state, Massachusetts, currently bans integrity testing. 92 Conversely, Rhode Island specifically sanctions the
use of integrity tests so long as they are "not used to form the primary
basis for an employment decision. "9 Additionally, at least one opponent
of integrity testing has argued that state polygraph statutes should
be interpreted as applying to written integrity tests,9 but the only
cases in which the issue has arisen have declined to embrace such an
interpretation.95 Opponents also allege that employers utilizing integ-

89.

Inwald, supra note 22, at 56.

90.

Id.

91. Id. "At a time when companies are in fierce competition for new employees, excessive
and erroneous rejections can leave important positions open, with disastrous effects on company
service and profitability." Id. One critic is quoted as saying that "[s]ome of these pencil-and-paper
honesty tests can screen out up to 70% of the people who take the tests." Harlan, supra note
14, at B4, col. 3 (quoting Robert Fitzpatrick, a Washington, D.C. employment lawyer).
92. The Massachusetts statute accomplishes this by specifically including written examinations within the penumbra of its definition of a prohibited "lie detector test." See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B(1) (West Supp. 1989) ("lie detector test" includes "any test utilizing
a polygraph or any other device, mechanism, instrument or written examination") (emphasis
added).
93. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.1 (Supp. 1988).
94. See Decker, supra note 7, at 149 (honesty tests "within the 'spirit' and 'intent' of
Pennsylvania polygraph statute").
95. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 912 n.8 (Mass. 1982) (noting that
legislature has forbidden use of polygraph but has not forbidden type of instrument at issue in
suit by discharged employees); Spannaus v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 745 (Minn.
1981) (upholding polygraph statute against vagueness attack by interpreting phrase "any test
purporting to test honesty" as including only "those tests and procedures which similarly purport
to measure physiological changes in the subject tested"). Neither of the other extant cases
involving integrity testing addressed the issue of the applicability of the state polygraph statute.
See generally Stanton Corp. v. Department of Labor, 166 A.D.2d 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(affirming trial court order to process Targeted Jobs Tax Credits not processed due to employer
use of integrity test). See also Heins v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 534 A.2d 592
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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rity tests might be civilly liable for defamation,9 invasion of privacy97

96. Improper disclosure of the fact that a job applicant has "failed" an integrity test might
expose the employer to liability for defamation. See Decker, supra note 7, at 147; Wiley &
Rudley, supra note 11, at 158; Comment, supra note 11, at 584; see also O'Brien v. Papa Gino's
of America, 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986) (affirming defamation liability of employer for communicating employee drug test results to others in the company); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry.
v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), cert. den., 434 U.S. 962 (1977) (same).
Employers do, of course, enjoy a qualified privilege which would shield them from liability for
such a communication to a party who had a legitimate interest in knowing the truth. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Walsh, 222 A.2d 830 (N.H. 1966). Also, proof of actual malice on the employer's part
will vitiate the privilege. O'Brien, 780 F.2d at 1074. Finally, truth is a defense to defamation.
Id. at 1073. But although it may literally be true that a particular applicant "failed the integrity
test," many courts are likely to look at the truth of the underlying allegation (i.e., that the
applicant is dishonest) if the fact of an applicant's failure is communicated to a third party who
has no legitimate interest in knowing it. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 389
N.W.2d 876, 888-89 (Minn. 1986) (relevant question in case of employees "fired for gross insubordination" was whether they in fact engaged in gross insubordination).
97. Some commentators have argued for the application of the constitutional right of privacy
to job applicants. See Hermann, supra note 52, at 126-37. The "state action" requirement,
however, precludes that application of constitutional privacy rights in the context of private
employment. On the "state action" requirement, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
554 (1875) (fourteenth amendment "prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen against
another"). Given appropriate facts, however, employer use of written integrity tests could
constitute tortious invasion of privacy. See Comment, supra note 11, at 583-84. There are four
types of tortious invasion of privacy: unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
appropriation of another's name or likeness; unreasonable publicity given to another's private
life; and publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
Questions on a written exam that are unduly intrusive and bear no demonstrable relation
to legitimate employer interests could conceivably amount to an "unreasonable intrusion." The
Restatement indicates that an "investigation or examination into . . . private concerns" can
trigger this kind of liability. Id. at § 652B, Comment b. One court has observed that the test
for invasion of privacy actions emanating from the private employment context is "whether the
substantiality of the intrusion on the employee's privacy ... outweighs the employer's legitimate
business interest in obtaining . . . the information." Bratt v. International Business Machs.,
785 F.2d 352, 360 (1st Cir. 1986). This argument has failed to succeed in both of the cases
where it has been raised in connection with a written examination. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers
Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 910 & 912 n.9 (Mass. 1982) (finding no invasion of privacy because discharged
employees refused to answer, or answered flippantly, allegedly intrusive questions, but acknowledging possibility that "there may be inquiries of a personal nature that are unreasonably
intrusive and no business of the employer"); Heins v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
534 A.2d 592, 594 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (employee's privacy rights "must be weighed against
an employer's legitimate desire to prevent theft"). It has been suggested that "an employee's
consent to employer inquiries is a defense to the invasion of privacy tort when the consent is
informed and knowing." Comment, supra note 11, at 584. Any such suggestion, however, is
sure to be met by the contention that any consent given by an employee or job applicant is not
"voluntary." See, e.g., ARTHUR MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 185-86 (1971) ("To talk
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or intentional infliction of emotional distress.9 8 Also, if it could be
demonstrated that the particular test instrument used by the employer
had a disparate impact on protected minorities, liability under Title
VII is possible.C.

A PreliminaryScreen of the Arguments

We acknowledge the seriousness of the problem confronting employers' ° and their legitimate interest in taking effective measures to
deal with it. 101 We think that the commonly encountered suggestion
that well-managed companies need not employ screening devices to
avoid theft is misplaced. lo2 We would be the last to deny that factors
other than employee selection affect the level of employee theft, and
even if companies had access to a completely accurate test they would
be ill-advised to place exclusive reliance on it. However, there are
obvious and widely acknowledged limits on the power of corporate
culture and management to control employee behavior.103

of information being 'voluntarily' given in the context of. . .an employment relationship...
is to ignore reality.")
Unnecessarily broad dissemination of the results of an applicant's integrity test conceivably
could amount to "unreasonable publicity." Comment, supra note 11, at 584 & n.58. However,
"publicity" in this context means that "the matter is made public, by communicating it to the
public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain
to become one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment
a (1977). Such widespread dissemination of test results seems to us highly unlikely.
98. Comment, supra note 11, at 584 (employers might face an intentional infliction of
emotional distress suit if outrageous conduct in testing procedures causes applicants to suffer
emotional distress). Normal testing situations, however, are unlikely to engender such liability.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) indicates that liability will only be found "where the conduct has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965).
99. See Decker, supra note 7, at 143-44; Wiley & Rudley, supra note 11, at 155; Comment,
supra note 11, at 578-82. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures prohibit
the use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on the opportunities of any
race, sex, or ethnic group unless such procedure has been properly validated. UNIFORM
GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES, 29 C.F.R. § 1,607.3(A) (1988).
100. See supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 73 n.79; Wiley & Rudley, supra note 11, at 154;
Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 27, at 91-92. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.

103. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 143 (1967) ("No one can fully
control the behavior of a large organization."); HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, ECONOMIC THEORY
AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 167 (1960) (as organization increases in size, amount of
detailed control higher authorities can exert over organizational activities declines);

GORDON
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We acknowledge the importance of employee rights concerning
privacy and access to employment, but unlike some opponents of testing,1° we do not see such rights as absolute.105 Increased initial disclosure may be one price employees must pay for the increasing level of
job security afforded by the erosion of employment at will.106 It is
reasonable that employers, confronted with legal developments making
it increasingly costly to rectify hiring mistakes,107 will respond by
trying to acquire as much information about job applicants as possible.
This information can be used by employers to reduce the incidence of
costly hiring mistakes.
One point that is often lost in the debates over all forms of testing
is the positive benefits honest employees derive from effective employer selection procedures.108 These potentially include increased
chances of securing employment,' °0 enhanced job security, 110 higher
2
wages,"' and a safer work environment.11
TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 142-93 (1965) (discussing "authority leakage," the
progressive loss of control over organizational sub-units that accompanies organizational expansion); John Child, Organizational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of
Strategic Choice, 6 SOCIOLOGY 1, 7 (1972) (increased size means potential loss of control).
104. See Hermann, supra note 52, at 110-11 (opposing personality testing on privacy grounds
even if it were absolutely infallible in predicting behavior); see also Chin, supra note 17, at
1320 n.20 & 1351 (suggesting that some of the organizations opposing polygraph examinations
on reliability grounds were really concerned with employee privacy and asking whether the
development of an infallible lie detecting device would be socially desirable).
105. "There may ... come a time where the substantial interest of the employer may take
precedence over the worker's right of privacy." Charles B. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process
in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1977), quoted in Chin, supra note 17,
at 1327 n.51.
106. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
107. See discussion supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
108. "Both employers and employees have an interest in maintaining a proper balance
between availability of information about employees and respect for the employees' right to
privacy." Brunn, supra note 52, at 390-91.
109. The greater the employer's ability to distinguish honest employees from potentially
dishonest ones, the lower the probability that the latter will be hired instead of the former.
The only beneficiary of the employer's inability to make such an identification is the potentially
dishonest employee.
110. See supra note 32 and accompanying text on the role of employee theft in causing
business failures. Honest employees who lose their jobs when their employers go out of business
obviously pay a substantial price for the dishonesty of some of their coworkers.
111. Employers who suffer fewer losses from employee theft and "intangible theft" are
more profitable and, as a result, can afford higher wages and better benefits. Less obvious is
the fact that if employers are unable to distinguish good workers from bad, hiring in effect
becomes a lottery and economically rational employers will pay only a lottery price for labor.
As employers' confidence in their ability to discriminate meaningfully among job applicants on
this dimension increases, so, presumably, will the price that they are willing to pay for labor.
112. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Just as some of the benefits of effective screening are overlooked,
a few of the concerns raised about integrity testing are, at best,
hypothetical. We are unaware of any evidence that integrity tests
have been used to screen out job applicants with pro-union sympathies
or who are likely to prove unusually resistant to unethical employer
pressures. Nor is there any convincing evidence that such tests have
an adverse impact on female or minority applicants. 3 Proper employer
handling of test results can minimize the likelihood that an applicant
who fails the test will be stigmatized by that failure. Proper handling
of the results will also reduce the employer's potential liability for
defamation and invasion of privacy. Similarly, careful selection and
administration of examination items can eliminate potential employer
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
No doubt some employers will use examinations unwisely, exposing
themselves to civil liability and the ultimate punishment that the market imposes on competitors who make bad business decisions. Even
a completely accurate integrity test will amount to no more than a
tool, albeit a very useful one, and as such should be used only with
a healthy awareness of its strengths and limitations. We are unwilling
to embrace the principle that any tool or idea should be rejected
merely because it is vulnerable to misuse.
The critics of integrity testing have, however, advanced a line of
argument that we do find disturbing and, ultimately, compelling. This
argument is based upon the validity of the integrity tests currently
in use and their potential for misidentifying honest applicants as potentially dishonest employees.114 We will subsequently refer to this problem with integrity tests as the "validity/base rate problem." To illustrate the importance of the validity/base rate problem, we begin with
a prefatory example.
113. See also D.W. ARNOLD, THE REID REPORT'S LACK OF ADVERSE IMPACT (1989);
K.K. BAGUS, INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION STUDIES (1988); DAVID J. CHERRINGTON,

VALIDATION OF THE APPLICANT REVIEW:

ANALYSIS

FOR ADVERSE IMPACT

(1989); DONALD MORETTI & WILLIAM TERRIS, THE PERSONNEL SELECTION INVENTORY:
A PREDICTION VALIDATION (1983); PERSONNEL DECISIONS INC., DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF THE PDI EMPLOYMENT INVENTORY (1985); A.L. STRAND & M.L. STRAND,
VALIDITY, RELIABILITY, COMPLIANCE, AND EFFICACY STUDIES OF THE T.A., E.S., D.A.,
AND P.A.S.S. SURVEYS (1986); William Terris, Attitudinal Correlates of Employee Integrity,
1 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOLOGY 60 (1985); William Terris & John W. Jones, Psychological
Factors Related to Employees' Theft in the Convenience Store Industry, 51 PSYCHOL. REP.
1219 (1982); Steven H. Werner, John W. Jones & Brian D. Steffy, The Relationship Between
Intelligence, Honesty, and Theft Admissions, 49 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 921
(1989).
114. See, e.g., Inwald, supra note 22, at 55-56 & 58; Pre-employment Screening, supra
note 11, at 4; Wiley & Rudley, supra note 11, at 154.
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IV. THE VALIDITY/BASE RATE PROBLEM

A. A Prefatory Example
Nippon Motors Corporation, responding to pressure from our trade
unions and politicians and to import quotas, has opened several automobile plants in the U.S. These plants are a huge success, turning
out top quality cars and trucks, and employing many American workers. U.S. firms supplying domestic automobile manufacturers, however, are far from happy. They argue that Nippon refuses to purchase
auto parts from them, instead importing from Japan everything not
manufactured in its U.S. plants. Nippon counters that its parts purchases are attributable to the fact that the parts made by U.S.
suppliers do not consistently meet Nippon's high quality standards
rather than to economic chauvinism. U.S. parts suppliers disagree,
and Nippon, hoping to quell criticism and forestall "domestic content"
legislation, agrees to purchase a certain percentage of the parts it
uses in its U.S. operations from local suppliers whose parts pass its
rigorous tests.
The test Nippon proposes to use on tires submitted by domestic
tire manufacturers for consideration as original equipment tires on
Nippon vehicles is a test Nippon calls the "X-scan." Nippon claims
that the X-scan is 98% accurate in identifying tires with a defect in
their sidewall structure which can cause premature tread wear and,
in extreme cases, represent a safety hazard. Not surprisingly, many
tires of the domestic manufacturer are rejected. Why? Are the domestic manufacturers' tires necessarily that bad? Not necessarily. The
key to the problem is that the 98% accuracy level claimed for the
X-scan is potentially deceptive. Those unfamiliar with statistical sampling may reasonably assume that if Nippon is telling the truth about
the X-scan's accuracy, 98% of the tires that the X-scan identified as
defective are in fact flawed. However, a 98% accuracy level under
these circumstances means that less than 20% of the tires identified
as defective are actually flawed! Table 1 demonstrates why this is so.
In the upper range of Table 1 the validity of the X-scan is set at
Nippon's claimed 98% and the base rate for tire defects is set at .005
(5 tires in 1000 are in fact flawed). If 10,000 tires are X-scanned, 50
actually will be defective. Because the test is only 98% accurate, only
49 of these (50 x .98) will be identified as flawed. So far, only one
defective tire will slip through. In an imperfect world, this level of
accuracy is quite admirable. However, although 9950 of the tires tested
are not defective, the X-scan will only correctly identify 9751 (9950
x .98) as non-defective, misidentifying 199 (9950 - 9751) perfectly
good tires as defective. Thus, only 19.8% (49) of the 248 (49 + 199)
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tires the X-scan identified as defective are truly defective, and a "98%
accurate" test is actually a test that correctly identifies defects less
than 20% of the time.11 The result of the X-scan is that Nippon
achieves an accuracy rate for the tires it accepts of 98%, while the
domestic manufacturer is returned 200 rejected tires of which approximately 75% ([200-49]/200) are perfectly good.
As Table 1 also illustrates, a reduction in the X-scan's accuracy
level to 90% (a very high level of test accuracy by social science
standards) reduces the odds of a correct identification of a flaw to just
over 4%. With an accuracy level of 90% the number of tires returned
increases and 95% ([1040-45]/1040) of the rejected tires are incorrectly
identified as defective. As the accuracy of the X-scan decreases, the
percentage of the domestic manufacturer's tires which are improperly
rejected increases. Therefore, the dynamics of the validity/base rate
interaction are such that relatively small variations in either factor
produce significant changes in test results, changes which lead to
counterintuitive conclusions about the efficacy of the test.
As the accuracy of the test declines, deception results from the
rise in the incorrect rejection ratio. When the test accuracy falls below
90% the problem of incorrect rejection becomes chronic. The next
section argues that the validity/base rate problem is even more problematic where integrity tests are concerned, but before we proceed
to that discussion, several other points about Nippon's X-scan are in
order.
First, note that the X-scan, despite its limitations, may nonetheless
satisfy all of Nippon's needs. If Nippon's only objective is to reduce
the number of defective tires it installs on its cars,11 6 the X-scan will
be very successful. The price of this objective, the rejection of a larger
number of non-defective tires, may be one Nippon is quite willing to
pay. Note also that Nippon's objective is an eminently reasonable one.
Defective tires are a safety hazard capable of causing death or serious
injury to Nippon's customers and substantial legal liability to Nippon.
Furthermore, the X-scan may be the best available tire testing procedure. None of this, however, is likely to be much comfort to the
manufacturers who have 199 good tires inaccurately rejected. Some

115. We acknowledge John Allen Paulos for the use of a similar example to illustrate a
statistical concept of conditional probability known as Bayes theorem. JOHN ALLEN PAULOS,
INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 89 (1990).
116. If Nippon has a second, covert objective of justifying its exclusive resort to Japanese
suppliers, this outcome can readily be achieved by manipulating the acceptable percentage of
defective tires (as determined by the X-scan) necessary to qualify any manufacturer as a Nippon
supplier.
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tire manufacturers will probably label Nippon's reliance on the X-scan
"unfair." The significance of the 199 misidentified tires assumes greater
importance when people seeking employment are substituted for automobile tires.
B.

Integrity Tests and the Validity/Base Rate Problem

Written integrity tests have been the object of discussion for at
least twenty years,'17 but the demise of the polygraph has intensified
the integrity test debate. Early inquiries concluded that too little
research had been done to allow a credible evaluation of such tests'
validity.lls A more exhaustive review of integrity testing in personnel
selection similarly concluded that additional research and the involvement of researchers independent from test vendors would be required
before a better evaluation of integrity tests could be made."1 9
More work has been done on integrity testing, but no consensus
concerning its validity has emerged. Some authorities continue to express skepticism about the tests' validity. 120 Others, however, have
pronounced them to be "valid and reliable.' 2' The tide appears to be
turning in favor of the responsible use of integrity tests as a device
for screening job applicants. Symbolic of this shift is the recently
published report of the APA Task Force on the Prediction of Dishonesty and Theft in Employment Settings which concluded that "[d]espite

117. See also Philip Ash, Screening Employment Applicants for Attitudes Toward Theft,
55 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 161 (1971); Richard W. Rosenbaum, Predictability of Employee
Theft Using Weighted Application Blanks, 61 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 94 (1976). For excellent
compendia, see Paul Sackett & Kurt Decker, Detection of Deceptionin the Employment Context:
A Review and Critique, 32 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 487 (1979); Sackett & Harris, supra note 2.
118. See also Sackett & Decker, supra note 117.
119. See Sackett & Harris, supra note 2, at 222.
120. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 14, at 7 ("we're very skeptical that there is anything that
is a true Pinocchio prognosticator"); Robert W. Moore & Robert M. Stewart, Evaluating Employee Integrity: Moral and Methodological Problems, 2 EMPLOYEE RESP. & RTS. J. 203, 213
(1989) ("the validity of the [integrity] tests does not appear to be sufficiently robust"). The
Office of Technology Assessment's most recent report concludes that "[t]he research on integrity
tests has not yet produced data that clearly supports or dismisses the assertion that these tests
can predict dishonest behavior." Office of Technology Assessment, The Use of Integrity Tests
for Pre-Employment Screening, cited in Tori DeAngelis, Honesty Tests Weigh in With Improved
Ratings, 22 APA MONITOR 7 (1991).
121. Thomas J. Bergmann, Daniel H. Mundt, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Illgen, The Evolution of
Honesty Tests and Means for Their Evaluation, 3 EMPLOYEE RESP. & RTS. J. 215, 221 (1990).
Paul Sackett, the author of a comprehensive review of integrity testing, has been quoted as
saying that "[t]he evidence is now much stronger that there is a relation between scores on
these tests and later counter-productive behavior on the job." Adler, supra note 14, at 7.
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all of our reservations about honesty tests ... we do not believe that
there is any sound basis for prohibiting their development and use. "1
As our prefatory example suggests, the use of written integrity
tests as a selection device can produce counterintuitive, and disturbing,
outcomes that reject perfectly good applicants. This undesirable result
becomes chronic when the test's validity rate declines. In our tire test
example, we knew both the base rate of tire defects and the validity
of the test. In the case of integrity testing, we have no way of knowing
with any degree of precision either the actual base rate for employee
dishonesty or the true validity of written integrity tests. In both cases,
however, sufficient information is available to enable us to make our
point.
Some consensus exists for placing the base rate for employee dishonesty in the neighborhood of 5%.123 Consequently, we focus on a
5% base rate in the following discussion, but employ a wider range
of base rates in Table 2, which follows. Where the validity of written
integrity tests is concerned, we rely mainly on a recent meta-analysis
of studies yielding criterion-related validities of such tests. 124 The mean
validity coefficients (when corrected for sampling error) reported in
12
those studies ranged from .26 to .76 depending on the criterion.'
This range is consistent with validity levels reported elsewhere.126
Table 2 accordingly provides outcomes produced by these and other
validity levels.

122.

APA

TASK FORCE,

supra note 18, at 26.

123. See HOLLINGER & CLARK, supra note 26, at 12 (base rate for non-trivial employee
theft less than 5% in most settings); Kevin R. Murphy, Detecting Infrequent Deception, 72 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 611, 612 (1987). A survey of wrongdoing among 225,000 job applicants
resulted in admissions of involvement in theft from 6.1% of the respondents. Philip Ash, Honesty
Test Scores, Biographical Data, and Delinquency Indicators, presented at the ACAD. CRIM.
JUST. Sci. (Mar. 1987) (available through SRA/London House, 1550 Northwest Highway, Park
Ridge, IL 60068).
124. See also Deniz S. Ones, Chockalingam Viswesvaran & Frank L. Schmidt, Integrity
Testing: Empirical Confirmations and Refutations Using Meta-Analysis, reported in APA
TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 17. For additional meta-analyses, see W.R. Kpo & W.G. Harris,
Generalizability of an Attitudinal-BehavioralMeasure of Integrity, presented at the Ann. Meeting New England Psychological Ass'n (Boston, 1986) (cited in Sackett, Burris & Callahan, supra,
note 2, at 516); Michael A. McDaniel & John W. Jones, A Meta-Analysis of the Validity of the
Employee Attitude Inventory Theft Scales, 2 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 327 (1986) (cited in Sackett,
Burris, & Callahan, supra note 2, at 517). We relied on Ones, Viswesvaran & Schmidt for two
reasons. First, it is more inclusive and contemporary. Second, the other meta-analyses produced
lower validity estimates. Clearly, lower validity levels result in even lower levels of accuracy
than our analyses here suggest.
125. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 17.
126. See also Sackett, Burris & Callahan, supra note 2; Sackett & Harris, supra note 2.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

Table 2 illustrates the interaction of these various base rates and
validity levels. The shaded portion of Table 2 highlights outcomes
obtained when the 5% base rate for employee theft suggested by the
literature is employed in conjunction with four different validity levels
(.90, .75, .50, .25).
Our method for determining the proportion of correctly identified
potential thieves is identical to the method we employed in our prefatory tire example. Consider the first shaded range (.90 validity; .05
base rate) in Table 2. Out of 10,000 job applicants the 5% base rate
indicates that 500 (10,000 x .05).will be potential thieves and the
remaining 9500 (10,000 - 500) will be honest. With a .90 test validity,
450 (.90 x 500) of the 500 potential thieves will be correctly identified
(accurate positives). Not only will 50 potential thieves elude identification, but only 8550 (9500 x .90) of the 9500 honest applicants will be
correctly identified as honest. Thus, 950 (9500 - 8550) job applicants
will be inaccurately labeled potential thieves (false positives). Dividing
the number of accurate positives (450) by the total of number of positives produced (1400; 450 + 950 false positives) indicates that the
actual probability that an applicant identified as a potential thief by
the test is actually dishonest is 32.1%. This means that 950 people
(over two-thirds of those rejected) will be wrongfully denied employment based upon this marginally accurate test.
Thus, even integrity tests possessing a high level of validity are
very likely to be mistaken when identifying any particular job applicant
as a potential thief. This potential for misidentification is even more
apparent when we consider the outcomes produced by tests whose
validity levels mirror those reported in published validity studies.127
As Table 2 illustrates, a test with a .25 validity (approximately the
bottom end of the reported range) will be correct in its designation
of a job applicant as a potential thief only 1.7% of the time. A test
with a validity level of .75 (approximately the upper end of the reported
range) will only be correct in its identification of potential thieves
13.6% of the time. Even the most optimistic assumption concerning
test validity (.90) and the most pessimistic estimate of the level of
employee theft (.15 base rate) yield an accuracy rate (61.4%) that
misidentifies one out of every three applicants identified as dishonest.
Such levels of accuracy enhance the probability that employers will
face some legal liability as a result of testing.128 Legal considerations

127.

See supra note 125 and accompanying text.

128.

LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 3.05 (1989) (inaccurate tests expose

employers to potential liability for employment discrimination, defamation, or negligence).
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aside, however, it is important to note that, at the higher validity
and base rate levels, integrity tests "do the job" for employers by
enabling them to screen out a substantial percentage of potentially
dishonest job applicants. For example, if test validity is .75 and the
base rate is .05, Table 2 confirms the fact that 375 (75%) of the 500
potentially dishonest applicants will be captured by the screen.
Table 2 also confirms the fact that this benefit is purchased at
the cost of denying employment to 2,375 honest applicants. True, these
individuals may ultimately gain employment elsewhere, but some of
them may not find jobs for a long time. Also, to the extent that
integrity exams are indeed reliable, 12 it is possible that some honest
applicants may repeatedly fail them. 130 As employer use of integrity
tests grows, such individuals may repeatedly be denied employment
for reasons beyond their understanding because "most applicants are
not, for legal reasons, told why they are not hired.' 131 Some employers
may see this as an acceptable price to pay for the undeniably worthy
goal of a more honest, efficient workforce. Job applicants, however,
can be expected to be considerably less enthusiastic about these risks
associated with integrity testing.
What level of test validity, if any, would be acceptable? One commentator suggests a "minimum threshold" which is satisfied "when
the data in favor of the hypothesis are at least as strong as the
evidence against this hypothesis.' 1 32 By this measure, if 50% of the
applicants identified as potential thieves were accurately so identified,
the misidentification of the other 50% would be permissible. We suspect that many persons (personnel directors included) would have

Beyond the formal impact of test inaccuracy on an employer's legal liability, properly presented
evidence of test inaccuracy seems likely to deprive employers of any presumption of reasonableness that they might otherwise enjoy in the minds of judges or jurors. Nor are the courts
completely unaware of the validity issue. See Daniel Const. Co. v. Local 257, IBEW, 856 F.2d
1174 (8th Cir. 1988), affirming an arbitrator's decision awarding back pay to employees fired
for failing a psychological test used to screen potential security risks from a nuclear plant
construction site. The arbitrator concluded that an appropriate and reasonable test must be
"reliable " and "valid" to satisfy the relevant collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1179. He
further concluded that the test in question was sufficiently reliable, but lacked adequate validity
because it "would have screened out a large number of employees who were actually stable,
while passing a number of employees who were unstable." Id.
129. See supra note 52.
130. "If integrity tests are reliable (in the sense that individual scores are fairly consistent
over tinie), then their use could create a population of persons who are repeatedly misclassified,
and systematically denied employment without cause." Wiley & Rudley, supranote 11, at 154-55.
131. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 12.
132. Murphy, supra note 123, at 612.
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qualms about this level of test error if their own employment prospects
were at stake. We also note that only two of the ranges examined in
Table 2 satisfy this minimal criterion. Both of those ranges involve
substantially higher levels of test validity (90%) and higher base rates
for employee theft (. 10 &. 15) than those reported in the literature.
Further test development might yield validity improvements and
further research might confirm higher base rates for employee theft.
Some persons, however, would be likely to object that integrity testing
was "unfair" if any honest person was denied employment due to test
inaccuracy. Is there any principled basis for such an objection? To
answer this question, we turn to a brief ethical analysis of the accuracy
dimension1- of integrity testing.
C.

The Ethics of Integrity Testing

In this section we will look at integrity testing through three ethics
"lenses": Kantian rights theory, Rawlsian Justice Theory, and classical
utilitarianism. 134 Of these three well-known theories, only utilitarianism
is likely to find integrity testing acceptable, and only under certain
circumstances. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory, 135 measuring
the moral quality of actions or practices 136 by their tendency to produce

133. We do not make any attempt here to discuss some of the other ethical issues associated
with integrity testing. For example, deceptive tests which disguise their essential purpose from
examinees plainly raise ethical concerns, as does the argument that prospective employees never
"voluntarily" consent to take integrity tests due to the inherently coercive aspects of the employment situation. On the latter point, see supra note 97.
134. Certainly, other ethics theories exist which could also profitably be applied to integrity
testing. Space constraints prevent an exhaustive examination of all applicable theories and the
three selected capture the great majority of the ethical underpinnings of the debate about
integrity testing. By selecting these theories we do not intend to "stack the deck" by presenting
a preponderance of theories likely to oppose integrity testing. We freely acknowledge the existence of other theories which might well support testing. For example, ethical egoism, the
doctrine that "each person ought to pursue his or her own self-interest exclusively," would
suggest that corporations believing integrity testing to be in their best interests not only could,
but should, engage in testing. We have not included egoism simply because we cannot envision
it playing any meaningful role in the social debate over integrity testing. For the quoted
definition of ethical egoism and a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses, see JAMES
RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

66-78 (1986).

135. Consequentialist, or teleological, theories judge the morality of actions according to
their consequences. Such theories are in contrast to deontological theories, which hold that
actions may be intrinsically right or wrong regardless of their consequences. For a discussion
of this basic division in ethical theory, see WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS chs. 2-3 (1963).
136. The utilitarian camp today is divided in many important ways. One fundamental schism
is between act-utilitarians, who look at the utility consequences of actions only, and rule-utilitarians, who believe that "the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness
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"the greatest happiness, or the greatest good, for the greatest
number.' ' 137 Those actions "are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness."' 13 "Happiness" means "pleasure, and the absence of
pain,' '1 39 and "unhappiness" means "pain, and the privation of pleasure."140
Utilitarians would therefore be likely to sanction integrity testing
if they were convinced that it maximized utility. Utility would be
maximized if the benefits derived from testing, such as lower theft
rates, higher profits and wages, and lower prices offset the unhappiness of honest job applicants denied employment and dishonest people
denied the opportunity to steal.' 41 Utilitarian calculations are notoriously difficult to do,142 but it seems fair to generalize by saying that,
ceteris paribus,143 the more accurate the examination, the more willing
or badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone should perform the action in like
circumstances." J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of UtilitarianEthics, in J.J.C. SMART
& BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 3, 9 (1976) (emphasis added).
Thus, rule utilitarians would oppose actions which maximize utility in individual cases if those
actions would not maximize long-run utility if universally adhered to.
137. WILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 601 (1980).
138. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10 (0. Piest ed. 1980).
139. Id.
140. Id. Today, many utilitarians eschew this hedonic measure of the good, adopting other
measures of utility. For example, preference utilitarianssuggest that we should act "so as to
maximize the satisfaction of people's preferences." RACHELS, supra note 134, at 93 (original
emphasis). Ideal utilitarians,on the other hand, say "only that right actions are the ones that
have the best results, however goodness is measured." MILL, supra note 138, at 10 (original
emphasis).
141. This tendency of utilitarianism to sacrifice the interests of the individual in the name
of the greater good has been one of the fundamental objections to it as an ethical theory. See
Richard Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 116
(1979) (discussing utilitarianism's "readiness to sacrifice the innocent individual on the altar of
social need"). Posner labels this aspect of utilitarianism the "moral monstrousness" problem,
and notes another dimension of it reflected by our inclusion of the unhappiness of would-be
thieves in our calculations, that is "utilitarian's refusal to make moral distinctions among types
of pleasure." Id.
142. See id. at 112-14 for a full discussion of this problem.
143. Of course, all other things never are equal. A sophisticated utilitarian analysis of
integrity testing would have to embrace a number of issues other than test validity. For example,
would the process of testing itself produce disutility by starting the employment relationship
on a note of distrust? For the suggestion that drug-testing and polygraph testing undermine
trust, see Patricia A. Greenfield, Ronald J. Karren & Janet K. Giacobbe, Drug Testing in the
Workplace: An Overview of Legal and PhilosophicalIssues, 2 EMPLOYEE RESP. & RTS. J. 1,
7 (1989) (drug-testing); Chin, supra note 17, at 1342-43 n.122 (polygraph). Also, such an analysis
should embrace the potential disutility which might result from the fact that good, potentially
utility producing workers may be erroneously screened out in favor of other workers who may
be honest, but less efficient.
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the utilitarian would be to sanction testing. Conversely, greater numbers of false positives would increase the potential unhappiness resulting from testing (i.e., to disappointed applicants and their economic
dependents). This would increase the probability that such unhappiness
would outweigh any benefits derived by employers and their economic
dependents.
Kantians, on the other hand, are unlikely to sanction integrity
testing so long as any individual is harmed by being misidentified as
potentially dishonest. Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative enjoins
us to "[a]ct as if the maxim of thy act were to become by thy will a
universal law of nature."'1' His Practical Imperative admonishes us to
' 145
"[t]reat every man as an end in himself, and never as a means only.'
The Categorical Imperative is, at best, an insistence on logical consistency; one should never "except oneself from the principle one's act
requires of others.1' 46 The Practical Imperative insists that we should
"never use another as an instrument.' 147 Thus, businesses that would
be unwilling to have their customers make purchase decisions using
a device like our mythical X-scan, l48 and managers who would be
unwilling to have their own employment prospects determined by a
test of similar accuracy, cannot consistently use integrity tests on job
applicants. To do so would be to treat wrongfully rejected honest
applicants as a means to the employer's end of a more honest work
force.
Rawlsians would be similarly unmoved by any utilitarian benefits
associated with integrity testing. Very early in A Theory of Justice
John Rawls tells us:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It
does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by the

many. 149
The focus is therefore on individuals getting what they justly deserve
rather than on the aggregate gains and losses to society at large from

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

REESE, supra note 137, at 278.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra part IV A.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1971).
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the practice at issue. Even if integrity testing does, in fact, maximize
utility or some other social value,150 that benefit cannot be purchased
at the cost of individual unfairness unless those harmed by the practice
are better off with it in place than without it. In a Rawlsian world,
"[a]ll social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and
the bases of self respect - are to be distributed equally unless an
unequal distribution of any ... of these values is to everyone's advantage. ' '151 We would have great difficulty arguing that honest job applicants who are denied employment due to a negative result on an
integrity test are better off than they would be without such a test.' 52
V.

CONCLUSION

We acknowledge the many legitimate reasons why employers may
be tempted to employ integrity testing to improve the quality of their
work forces and we are sympathetic with their plight. We hesitate to
call for an absolute ban on integrity testing for a number of reasons.
A ban would create disincentives to the development of more effective
test instruments,113 and we are not among those who oppose the very
notion of an integrity test on principle.' T In fact, if integrity tests
demonstrated very high validity levels and the base rate for employee
theft was significantly higher than the basic 5% rate suggested by the
literature, we might well be moved by utilitarian considerations to
sanction testing. At present, however, we are forced to conclude
that the admitted benefits of today's integrity testing are purchased
at far too high a price.

150. One such competing value is economic efficiency. For a superb discussion of efficiency
and its relation to utilitarian theory, see generally Posner, supra note 141.
151. RAWLS, supra note 149, at 62 (emphasis added).
152. See id. at 149. Although the main point of Rawls's effort was to identify principles of
justice which should apply to society and its institutions, Rawls also acknowledged that "a
complete theory of right includes principles for individuals as well." Id. at 108. Basic to these
is the "duty of justice," which "requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that
exist and apply to us" and "to further just arrangements not yet established ... when this can
be done without too much cost to ourselves." Id. at 115. Rawls thus speaks both to the legal
policymakers who must ultimately decide whether society should allow employment decisions
to be based, in whole or in part, upon integrity tests, and to individual companies that, in the
absence of regulation, must decide whether to use such tests as a screening device.
153. See Chin, supra note 17, at 1353-54, for this criticism of the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988.
154. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

